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Abstract
A productivity shock leads to a large international transfer of capital and negative co-
movement of investment in the typical two-country real business cycle model. Most
recent models that attempt to reduce or remove this transfer produce unrealistically
low investment volatility. We show that adding organizational capital to the techno-
logical environment of a relatively standard international business cycle model can
ameliorate this problem. In addition we show that GHH preferences along with the
above modiﬁcation are suﬃcient to deliver positive cross-country correlations of con-
sumption, hours, output and investment.
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While there is clear evidence that business cycles are correlated in developed coun-
tries, generating positive co-movement between countries has proved to be quite hard
in the context of real international business cycle models (IRBC henceforth).1 This
issue has been at the heart of research in two country real business cycle models since
the seminal work of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) (BKK henceforth). In the
absence of endogenous mechanisms that would generate international co-movement,
these models typically rely on correlated total factor productivity shocks to deliver
this co-movement. While it is relatively easy to generate co-movement in output
and consumption using correlated shocks, it is quite diﬃcult to do so for investment.
Indeed, the prototypical IRBC model will generate large negative cross-country cor-
relations of investment. The goal of this paper is to write down a simple modiﬁcation
of the canonical two-country, one-good international real business cycle model that
can solve this problem.
Before turning to our model, we brieﬂy discuss existing attempts at resolution and
why success has been limited for the most part. The reason this occurs is because
negative co-movement in investment is built into the heart of the canonical model and
is therefore diﬃcult to overcome. To see this, consider a positive shock to productivity
in the home country that raises the relative return to capital in that country. The
ensuing increase in investment in the home country is ﬁnanced partially by domestic
means as well as by resources which ﬂow in from the foreign country. At the same
time, investment is relatively less attractive in the foreign country so agents reduce
foreign investment below steady-state levels and we end up with highly negative co-
1Evidence can be found in Ambler, Cardia and Zimmermann (2004) who compare 190 country
pairs and ﬁnd that cross-country correlations of output, consumption, investment and hours are
positive on average. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the cross-country correlations of investment and hours
are positive for at least seventy-ﬁve percent of the 190 pairs.
2movement in investment between the two countries.
Since the early work of BKK, a large number of modiﬁcations of the canonical model
have been proposed to ameliorate this, and other discrepancies between the implica-
tions of the model and the actual features of the data. We focus here on the small, but
growing, set of articles that actually succeed in delivering positive investment corre-
lations by modifying the standard IRBC model in various ways. A common feature of
these models is that they achieve a positive investment correlation between countries
at the expense of a fall in the relative volatility of investment. In the data, the HP
ﬁltered standard deviation of investment is approximately three times as volatile as
output. None of these studies are able to simultaneously deliver realistic international
correlations of investment as well as suﬃciently volatile investment. It would appear
there is a trade-oﬀ between the two moments in the basic structure of the model.
This trade-oﬀ is clearly visible in the simulation results of Baxter and Farr (2005),
Ravn and Mazzenga (2004) or Heathcote and Perri (2002). A quick look at Table 2
(pp. 344) of Baxter and Farr reveals that the cross-country correlation of investment
rises while the relative volatility of investment falls as one goes from case 1 to case 3.
Similar patterns can be found in Canova and Ubide (1998), Kehoe and Perri (2002),
Ambler et al (2002) as well as in Corsetti et al (2008).2
The above pattern is not accidental. Any mechanism designed to slow down the ﬂow
of resources across countries will likely also reduce the amount of investment that can
be ﬁnanced by the country where productivity is relatively high. This will lead to a
fall in the volatility of investment at the same time that its international investment
correlation increases. This idea is illustrated in Figure 1a for a one-good model where
we plot the volatility of investment against its cross-country correlation while varying
a capital adjustment cost parameter. This is done in a standard IRBC model with
2Two exceptions are Cook (2002) and Head (2002).
3incomplete asset markets.3 Not only is the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between the two
moments clearly visible, it is also apparent that even the most basic two country
model can generate a positive cross-country investment correlation if one is willing to
tolerate suﬃciently low investment volatility.
Our reading of the literature leads us to conclude that while progress has been made in
accounting for the observed international co-movement of investment, current expla-
nations remain partial and unsatisfactory in that they cannot simultaneously account
for the observed volatility of investment. Suitably calibrated two-good models, as well
as models with multiple shocks, help to reduce the discrepancy between model and
data but are not able to eliminate it.4 We return to Figure 1a to explain this point.
The ﬁgure reveals that the trade-oﬀ discussed above is quite potent, in that, even mi-
nor reductions in volatility can lead to big increases in the correlation in percentage
terms. For example, decreasing the relative volatility of investment from roughly 2.7
to just 2.4 leads to a movement in the international correlation from roughly -0.1 to
0.1, a move of two hundred percent. Given this sensitivity, it is important to control
the volatility of investment wherever possible before evaluating any movements in its
international correlation, as we will do.
Is it possible to stay close to the spirit of the canonical model and simultaneously
generate realistic international co-movement as well as volatility? In this paper we
answer the above question in the aﬃrmative. This goal is achieved by modifying the
technological environment in which ﬁrms operate. The novel element is a new input
(in addition to labour and physical capital) which we refer to as organizational capital.
3The cross-country correlations of shocks is set at 0.323.
4Pakko (2003) highlights the role of low substitution elasticities in a two-good version of the
model in generating a positive international correlation for investment. Once again, this is only
achieved via a drastic reduction in investment volatility. A similar problem plagues Dotsey and
Duarte (2008) which stresses the role of non-traded goods in a monetary model with an interest rate
rule and real shocks.
4Organizational capital (OC) may be thought of in terms of knowledge or ideas related
to the process of production that help determine how much output results from the
application of conventional inputs in the context of a particular technology. We think
of OC as being a key determinant of the endogenous component of productivity,
something that is co-produced by ﬁrms in the process of creating output. The idea
that ﬁrm’s are store-houses of OC can be found in Prescott and Vischer (1980) and
more recently in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) who measure the value of OC in the US
economy and ﬁnd that it is roughly half the size of the physical capital stock. Hou and
Johri (2008) show that a model with OC ﬁts aggregate US data signiﬁcantly better
than a standard DSGE model. Moreover, the model does a better job of capturing
the dynamic responses of the US economy to various shocks.
We think that the presence of OC may be a useful way to model the reasons why
ﬁrms may not wish to transfer capital internationally with the same ease and intensity
as implied by the typical two country model in response to transitory productivity
shocks. In the real world, moving capital can lead to the permanent loss of ﬁrm
speciﬁc knowledge and skills embodied in workers and managers.5 These losses would
have an impact on productivity which can only be made up slowly over time. While
the canonical model allows for costs to adjusting the capital stock, it does not take
into account these potential productivity losses. The introduction of OC into the
production technology is an attempt to try to take into account these additional
considerations in the simple aggregate context of a one-good model.
Organizational capital is modeled following the learning-by-doing (LBD) speciﬁcation
used in Cooper and Johri (2002), in which agents accumulate OC as a by-product
of past output. A crucial (and empirically important) feature of this speciﬁcation
is that OC created in the past makes a diminishing contribution to the creation of
5Or this knowledge may reside in the match between worker and capital or in a team. The
dissolution of these matches or teams may lead to a loss of information and productivity.
5future levels of OC. As a result, reductions in current output lead to a reduction in
future levels of OC which imply a fall in productivity. Since physical capital is used to
produce output, a current reduction in investment leads to a future fall in capital and
consequently a future fall in productivity. Realizing this dynamic linkage between
investment decisions and future productivity levels, agents in the foreign country are
loath to reduce investment in response to a home-country productivity shock. Orga-
nizational capital also acts as a magniﬁcation device leading to an increased volatility
in home country variables. The trade-oﬀ between international co-movement and in-
vestment volatility mentioned above is present in our model as well, however, the OC
model generates higher investment correlations for each level of investment volatility.
As can be seen in Figure 1b, the introduction of OC is equivalent to an upward shift
in the trade-oﬀ plot shown in Figure 1a.
We now provide a brief discussion of the relevance of learning-by-doing and especially
of our speciﬁcation of OC. There is a large empirical literature documenting the per-
vasive inﬂuence of learning-by-doing in productive activities dating back a hundred
years. Recent micro-economic studies include Benkard (2000), Thompson (2001),
Thornton and Thompson (2001) and Clarke (2006). Cooper and Johri (2002) provide
2-digit and 4-digit evidence for the U.S. manufacturing sector. Aggregate evidence
from the U.S. for the speciﬁc form of learning used here can be found in Johri and
Letendre (2007) and Hou and Johri (2008). These studies ﬁnd that agents and orga-
nizations appear to become more productive as they gain experience at producing a
particular product or service. A number of these studies also report spillover eﬀects
in learning across similar products, both within and across ﬁrms. We ignore these
eﬀects in order to focus on the mechanism described above.
Our model builds on the closed economy framework of Cooper and Johri which is
inspired by the early work of Arrow (1962) and especially Rosen (1972) on learning as
a by-product of production. In the dynamic general equilibrium literature, learning-
6by-doing and OC has been used mainly in closed economy contexts (Cooper and Johri
2002, Clarke and Johri 2009, Johri 2009 and Gunn and Johri 2010). In open-economy
models it has been shown to help generate persistent movements in the real exchange
rate (Johri and Lahiri 2008) in response to monetary shocks.
In order to deliver international co-movement in all major aggregate variables without
sacriﬁcing realism in the relative volatility of investment, we adopt two other modiﬁ-
cations of the one-good, two-country canonical model from the literature. These are
the presence of incomplete asset markets of the kind discussed in Baxter and Crucini
(1995) and the use of preferences associated with the work of Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Huﬀman (1988), GHH henceforth. We show that this model, calibrated to US
data, can deliver all the key features of international co-movement discussed above.
In particular the cross-country correlations of consumption, output, hours as well as
investment are all positive. The role of GHH preferences is to make the cross-country
correlation of hours positive as in Raﬀo (2008) while incomplete markets lowers the
cross-country correlation of consumption.
The key feature of GHH preferences is that the income eﬀect of a change in productiv-
ity on hours is absent. As a result, hours in both countries closely follow movements
in productivity. Since productivity shocks are correlated, so are hours. GHH pref-
erences are commonly used in the open-economy literature dating back to Devereux,
Gregory and Smith (1992). See Letendre (2004), Letendre and Luo (2007), Raﬀo
(2008) and Boileau and Normandin (2008a) for some recent examples.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our two-country model. Section
3 explains how we solve the model and select parameter values. Section 4 analyzes
the dynamic properties of our model. Section 5 discusses the moments implied by
our model and Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
72. Model
Our economy is composed of two countries labeled “the home country” and “the
foreign country”. Each country is inhabited by a large number of inﬁnitely lived
identical agents. Both countries produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good which may be
used either for consumption or for investment. The ﬁnal good can be traded freely
across the two countries, but trade in ﬁnancial assets is restricted to a simple non-
contingent real bond. We denote all foreign country variables with an asterisk.






tU(Ct,Nt), 1 > β > 0 (1)






, ψ > 0, ν > 1, σ > 0 (2)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the agent’s
time t information set, Ct denotes consumption, Nt denotes hours worked, β is a
discount factor, σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ν determines the Frisch
labour supply elasticity and ψ determines the relative weight of consumption and
leisure.
Output in the home country (Y ) is produced using labour (N), physical capital (K),







t , 0 < ε,α < 1, (3)
where At is a stationary productivity shock. Since we are focusing on movements at
the business cycle frequency we ignore technical progress of any form.
The technology diﬀers from the standard neo-classical production function (used in
the model without OC) because the agent carries a stock of organizational capital
8which is an input in the production technology. Organizational capital refers to the
information accumulated by the agent, through a learning process involving past
production, regarding how best to organize his production activities and combine
inputs. As a result, the higher the level of organizational capital, the more productive
the agent. Note that there are diminishing returns to accumulating organizational
capital, a feature often found in empirical studies of learning-by-doing.
There are at least two ways to think about what constitutes organizational capital.
Some, like Rosen (1972), think of it as a ﬁrm speciﬁc capital good while others
focus on speciﬁc knowledge embodied in the matches between workers and tasks or
machines within the ﬁrm. While these diﬀerences are important, especially when
trying to measure the payments associated with various inputs, they are not crucial
to the issues at hand which involve the loss of these forms of knowledge as a result
of disinvestment. As a result we do not distinguish between the two.
The exact speciﬁcation of how learning-by-doing leads to productivity increases can
be found in Cooper and Johri (2002) which draws on early work by Arrow (1962) and
Rosen (1972). Learning is modeled through an accumulation equation for organiza-
tional capital which is closely related to the empirical learning-by-doing literature in
which each cumulative unit of past production contributes equally to the creation of
knowledge. Recent studies include Bahk and Gort (1993), Irwin and Klenow (1994),
Jarmin (1994), Thompson (2001) and Thornton and Thompson (2001). Our spec-
iﬁcation diﬀers from the typical one, in that the contribution of production in any
period to the current level of organizational capital is decreasing over time. Following






t , 0 < γ < 1 (4)
where Ht denotes the stock of organizational capital available to the agent at time t.
9H0 denotes the initial endowment of organizational capital which must be positive.
This modiﬁcation of the traditional speciﬁcation of learning has a number of advan-
tages. First, it allows for the sensible idea that production knowledge may become
less and less relevant over time as new techniques of production and management,
new product lines, new workers and new markets emerge. Second, it allows in a
general way for the idea that some match speciﬁc knowledge may be lost to ﬁrms
in the economy as workers leave or get reassigned to new tasks or teams within the
ﬁrm. In addition, the knowledge accumulated through production experience will be
a function of the current vintage of physical capital. The decision to replace physical
capital will imply that the existing stock of organizational capital will be less relevant.
Third, it allows for the existence of a steady state in which the stock of organizational
capital is constant. In contrast, the traditional speciﬁcation in the empirical learning-
by-doing literature allows the stock of organizational capital to grow unboundedly.
An alternative way to bound OC is to assume that productivity increases due to OC
occur for a ﬁxed number of periods. While this may be appropriate for any one task
or worker within the economy, we think of the economy as a whole as an environment
with an ever changing set of tasks, workers, teams, machines and information. In this
context it may be better to model organizational capital as continually accumulating
and depreciating.
The restriction γ < 1 is consistent with the empirical evidence supporting the hy-
pothesis of depreciation of organizational capital often referred to as organizational
forgetting. Argote et al. (1990) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis of
organizational forgetting associated with the construction of Liberty Ships during
World War II. Similarly, Darr et al. (1995) provide evidence for this hypothesis for
pizza franchises and Benkard (2000) provides evidence for organizational forgetting
associated with the production of commercial aircraft. One diﬀerence between these
studies and this paper is that the accumulation technology is log-linear rather than
10linear. Clarke (2006) shows that the additional curvature in this log-linear technology
produces similar predictions for aggregate variables in a closed economy context. We
expect similar results to follow in the current context6.
The accumulation equation for the stock of physical capital in the home country is







Kt, 0  ϕ, 0 < δ < 1 (5)
where It denotes investment made in the home country and δ is the depreciation rate
of physical capital. The accumulation equations for the stock of physical capital (5)
and (7) include capital adjustment costs, which are governed by the parameter ϕ, to
smooth investment movements. The adjustment costs function is set in such a way
that the model with adjustment costs has the same steady state as the model without
them.














α, 0 < ε,α < 1 (6)
and the capital accumulation equation is
K
∗


























1−γ, 0 < γ < 1. (8)






































6Another seemingly crucial feature of our model is that organizational capital is accumulated as
a by-product of production. This ignores the considerable intentional investments made by ﬁrms
in raising productivity. Hou and Johri (2008) show that allowing for intentional investments in
organizational capital result in only small diﬀerences from the Cooper and Johri (2002) model.
11where ρ and ρ∗ measure the persistence of domestic and foreign productivity shocks,
υ and υ∗ measure the degree of spillovers across countries, σ2
ϵ denotes the variance of
innovation ϵ and τ denotes the cross-country correlation of innovations.
The ﬁnancial markets in our world economy are incomplete. More speciﬁcally, only
one-period risk-free real bonds can be traded. These bonds are traded at price Pt =
(1 + rt+1)−1, where rt+1 is the domestic real return on bonds purchased in period t.
That is, rt+1 is the interest rate linking periods t and t + 1. We denote the quantity
of discount bonds purchased by residents of the home country in period t by Bt+1
(each paying one unit of consumption in period t+1). The budget constraint for the
representative agent in the home country is
Ct + It + PtBt+1 = Yt + Bt. (10)














We assume that bonds are in zero net supply, so bond market clearing requires
Bt + B
∗
t = 0. (12)
Following Devereux and Smith (2007) we assume there are some frictions in the bond
market that create an interest rate diﬀerential across countries. Formally we assume
1 + rt+1 = (1 + r
∗
t+1) e
−χ[Bt+1− b], χ > 0 (13)
where r∗
t is the foreign real interest rate and ¯ b denotes bond holdings of the home
country in steady state. The “premium” e−χ[bt+1− b] appearing in (13) implies that the
further in debt the domestic country gets (the more negative B becomes) the higher




t = Pt e
−χ[bt+1− b].
12Technically, we need a mechanism to deal with the existence of a unit root in bond
accumulation in the incomplete markets economy and our “risk premium” is one way
to make the model stationary (see Boileau and Normandin (2008b) for more on this
issue).
3. Model Solution and Parameter Values
An approximate linear solution to our model is obtained using the method outlined in
King, Plosser and Rebelo (2002). See the Appendix for the ﬁrst-order conditions and
details about how we solve the model (and a special case of it without OC). The KPR
method requires us to assign values to the model’s parameters. Except for the values
associated with OC most of the parameter values used in our work are commonly
found in the business cycle and international macro literature. We now explain how
we assign values to the parameters in our international business cycle model with OC
(Table 1 provides a summary of our parameter values).
The reference period is a quarter. Following the IRBC literature we set the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, σ, to 2. We let ψ adjust so that the fraction of time spent
working in steady state is equal to 0.3. The remaining preference parameter ν is
set to 3 so that the Frisch labour supply elasticity has a value of 0.5 which is near
the middle of the range of micro estimates. We set the discount factor β to 0.993 a
common value in the RBC literature (see Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) among
others).
The United States net foreign asset position has dramatically changed since the early
1980s. From the 1950s to the early 1980s, the position (as a percentage of output)
was around 10% (see for example Masson et al 1994). It has since plunged to around
negative 20% (see for example Gourinchas and Rey (2007)). The average over the
13period 1975-2005 is close to zero (-0.03). Accordingly, we set ¯ b = 0 which implies zero
net foreign asset holding in steady state.
An estimate of χ can be found in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001): χ = 0.001.
The capital adjustment cost parameter ϕ is set to produce a realistic investment
volatility relative to the volatility of output. While the exact number for this relative
volatility varies slightly from one paper to the next, it is normally around 3 for US
data detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott or band-pass ﬁlters. For example, BKK
(1995) report a relative investment volatility of 3.27, Baxter and Farr (2005) report
2.98, and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) report 2.78. Accordingly, we set ϕ so
that the model produces a relative standard deviation of investment of 3.
For the technology parameters, we use the values α = 0.55, ε = 0.24, δ = 0.02, and
γ = 0.95 estimated by Johri and Letendre (2007) using aggregate US data. These
values imply a capital-output ratio of 9.8 and a labour share of 0.7. Also, the value
ε = 0.24 implies an eighteen percent learning rate which is fairly conservative.
Finally we discuss the parameters related to the technology shocks. The variance of
the innovations σ2
ϵ is adjusted so that each model matches the standard deviation of
output in the data. Again, this value varies across papers for US data. For example,
BKK (1995) report a value of 1.92, Baxter and Farr (2005) report 1.69, and Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) report 1.82. The latter number is in the middle of the
pack so we set σ2
ϵ to match it. International spillovers are not estimated precisely (see
for example BKK (1992)) so we follow Baxter and Crucini (1995), Baxter and Farr
(2005) and Kehoe and Perri (2002) (to name a few) and set υ = υ∗ = 0.
For the cross-country correlation of shocks we use a recent estimate of corr(ϵ,ϵ∗) =
0.323 calculated by Boileau and Normandin (2008b). Their estimate is slightly larger
than the estimate of 0.258 initially found by Backus et al (1992). This is understand-
14able since BKK allowed the shocks process to have non-zero international spillovers
when estimating corr(ϵ,ϵ∗). Given that our process has zero spillovers we think that
Boileau and Normandin’s estimate, which was computed imposing zero spillovers, is
a more appropriate number. Accordingly we set corr(ϵ,ϵ∗) = 0.323.
We follow Kollmann (1996), Kehoe and Perri (2002) and others and set the persistence
of the Solow residual to 0.95. Note that in our model the Solow residual is endogenous
and is given (in logs) by lnA + εlnH. When OC is not included in the model,
the Solow residual is entirely exogenous and is equal to lnA. Since OC generates
some endogenous persistence in the Solow residual we actually use a slightly lower
ρ in the OC model (ρ = 0.945) than in the no-OC model (ρ = 0.95) so that the
autocorrelation of the Solow residual is the same in both models. Note that the
cross-country correlation of the Solow residuals is the same (0.32) in the OC and
no-OC models so we use corr(ϵ,ϵ∗) = 0.323 in both models.
4. Dynamics of the model
In this section we discuss the economics of our model in the context of impulse
responses to technology shocks which can be found in Figures 2 and 3. To calculate














0.01 0 0 0 ...
0.01 corr(ϵ, ϵ∗) 0 0 0 ...

. (14)
That is, the home country experiences a one percent positive shock and the foreign
country simultaneously experiences a shock of size 0.01corr(ϵ, ϵ∗). We look at the
responses of both the models with and without OC for two separate cases, one where
corr(ϵ, ϵ∗) = 0.323 and another where corr(ϵ, ϵ∗) = 0.
154.1 Investment Dynamics
4.1.1 Model without Organizational Capital
Figure 2 plots the response of investment for both countries in the calibrated versions
of our model (labeled I OC and I∗ OC) and its no-OC version (labeled I and I∗).
The impact of organizational capital is clearly visible in the ﬁgure, especially for the
dynamics of investment in the foreign country. While I∗ falls below steady state on
impact, I∗ OC rises and stays above steady state for a number of periods. Recall
that the path of foreign country investment in this ﬁgure is jointly determined by the
exogenous movement in technology, A∗ (due to the presence of correlated shocks) and
the endogenous response of the foreign country agent to the home country shock. In
order to isolate the impact of organizational capital on the dynamics of the model,
we wish to switch oﬀ the former eﬀect. As a result, in Figure 3, we study the
case of uncorrelated shocks where A∗ remains at steady state levels throughout the
exercise.We also impose the same value of ϕ (namely ϕ = 2.76) on both models so
that this is no longer a source of variation between the responses of the two models.
Figure 3 emphasises the diﬀerent responses of the foreign agent to the domestic
shock across the two models. In the model without organizational capital, investment
falls in the foreign country and stays below steady state for roughly ten quarters. The
presence of organizational capital cuts the negative response of the foreign agent by
about half on impact and shortens the time spent below steady state to about ﬁve
quarters. Comparatively speaking, the response of the domestic agent is similar in
the two models, though there is some evidence of magniﬁcation in the OC model.
In order to analyze these diﬀerential responses in Figure 3, we will study the two
models in turn, starting with the no-OC model. We will end the discussion with a
brief comment on the additional impact of the exogenous shocks in Figure 2.
16In order to explain why investment behaves diﬀerently in the two countries we






















t ]α + 1   δ
}
(16)
A glance at (15) and (16) reveals that the response of investment is governed by two
factors which we discuss in turn. The ﬁrst factor is the expression within braces which
captures the return to capital accumulation. The second factor is the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption in periods t and t+1 given by MRS  βλ1t+1/λ1t.
In the impact period of the shock, since capital is predetermined, the return on capital
for a given level of investment is governed mainly by At+1 directly and indirectly
through its eﬀect on Nt+1. As we will discuss below, hours will rise in the home
country so that the return to accumulating capital rises. On its own, this would cause
the home country agent to increase investment. This desire to invest is somewhat
dampened by a small fall in the MRS as consumption rises slowly. Due to the desire
to smooth consumption, the MRS changes only by a small amount in response to the
shock. The small drop in MRS is dominated by the large and persistent technology
shock which raises the marginal product of capital. The rise in hours accentuates this
increase. To satisfy the Euler equation (15), investment must increase in the home
country and stay above steady state until the persistent eﬀects on the productivity
of capital slowly wear oﬀ.
The analysis of the response of the foreign agent uses the same elements as above
but is simpliﬁed by the absence of any exogenous movement in productivity since
we are studying the uncorrelated shock case in Figure 3. Anticipating the analysis
of the next section, since the response of N∗ (which is governed by A∗ and K∗) is
zero on impact and extremely small in the period after the shock, there is hardly any
movement in the return to capital. As a result, the drop in I∗ can be understood
17mostly by the movement in MRS*. Why does MRS* fall when productivity rises
in the home country? Recall that the two countries are linked together by trade in









The persistent positive shock in the home country creates a desire for an increase
in investment and consumption there. In a closed economy, either the desire for in-
creased consumption must be tempered or leisure sacriﬁced in order to satisfy the
desire for more capital. Both of these responses reduce utility and dampen the in-
crease in investment. In an open economy, however, there exists an alternative avenue
to ﬁnance investment: acquiring resources from the other country. In our model envi-
ronment, the home country can ﬁnance some of its investment through international
borrowing by selling bonds to the foreign country. For the bond market to clear,
the additional supply of bonds must result in a fall in their price below steady state.
The Euler equation (17) implies that the fall in P ∗ must be accompanied by a fall in
MRS*. In other words the return to bonds must rise above its steady state value in
order to induce the foreign agent to postpone his consumption. This allocative signal
also induces the observed fall in investment in the foreign country.
When shocks are correlated across countries, the price of bonds must fall even
more because the small shock experienced by the foreign country raises the return
to investment and, everything else equal, makes the foreign agent also interested in
borrowing to invest. Since the home shock is much bigger, and the home country’s
desire to borrow much greater, the bond price must fall even more than in the zero-
correlation scenario to convince the foreign country to lend to the home country.
184.1.2 Model with Organizational Capital
We now turn to the response of investment in our model with OC in Figure 3 which
will be followed by a short discussion of the case depicted in Figure 2 with correlated
shocks. The focus of our discussion will be the diﬀerential response of investment
in the foreign country relative to the model without OC discussed above. In order
to understand why the drop in investment in the foreign country is so much smaller
than in the no-OC model we turn to the appropriate Euler equations abstracting once
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for the home and foreign countries respectively.
Given the similarities of the two models, the impact of bond prices and the marginal
product of capital on the behavior of investment is relatively similar and not surpris-
ing. Comparing the capital Euler equation in the no-OC model (16) with (19) shows
that the ﬁrst term inside braces in (19) is very similar to the expression on the right
side of (16). Once again, the fall in bond prices dominate any small changes in the
marginal product of capital. Therefore, the foreign agent is induced to postpone con-
sumption, buy home country bonds and reduce investment. This eﬀect is mitigated
by the presence of a new term appearing in the capital Euler equation. This term
captures the value of time t + 2 organizational capital that is induced by the extra
output created by having an additional unit of physical capital in t+1 and reﬂects the
fact that agents internalize this link between investment in period t and the amount
of organizational capital available in t + 2. Should we expect this eﬀect to moderate
the desire of the foreign agent to reduce I∗
t ? The answer lies in the signal sent by the
relative price (value) of organizational capital to the consumption good. This price
19is captured in the ratio of Lagrange multipliers λ∗
3t+1/λ∗
1t in (19) which represents
the value of an additional unit of H∗
t+2 in terms of current consumption. One might
expect that this price will rise as future quantities of organizational capital become
relatively scarce as can indeed be seen in Figure 4. On its own, this rise in the relative
price of future organizational capital induces the agent to try to accumulate more of
the scarce factor. Overall, it acts as a countervailing force to the strong incentives
coming from the home country via the fall in bond prices. This results in a smaller
drop in investment on impact as well as a shorter duration of time spent below steady
state investment levels.
Turning from Figure 3 to Figure 2, the main diﬀerence is that the foreign country now
also receives a small shock which raises the marginal product of capital. The foreign
agent now has an additional incentive to increase investment which is suﬃcient to
make its investment response positive.
4.2 Hours Dynamics
Since the eﬀect of GHH preferences on the behaviour of hours is relatively well under-
stood, we only provide a short discussion without any ﬁgures of what to expect from
the two models. To understand the role of GHH preferences it is useful to compare
the ﬁrst-order condition for hours in our no-OC model and a variant of it where the





t (1   Nt)1−ψ
]1−σ
1   σ
, 1 > ψ > 0, σ > 0 (20)
instead of the GHH form in (2).
The hours ﬁrst-order condition of the no-OC model with preferences (20) is given
below. It equates the marginal disutility of working an extra hour with the marginal










Recall that a weakly correlated productivity shock raises the marginal product of
labour in both countries. On it’s own, this encourages both countries to raise hours
above steady state. With standard preferences the increase in consumption fueled
by the wealth eﬀect, however, tends to dampen the desire to increase hours. In the
home country the former dominates the latter but in the foreign country the relatively
weak productivity shock is overshadowed by the wealth eﬀect resulting in hours falling
quickly.
With GHH preferences, the wealth eﬀect is eliminated. As a result only the substi-







This suggests that hours and labour productivity will move together in both countries.
Linearizing the above condition and the production function yields (ν   α) ˆ Nt =
ˆ At +(1 α) ˆ Kt where a “hat” denotes a variable in percent deviation from its steady
state (e.g. ˆ Nt  (Nt   ¯ N)/ ¯ N). Given the typical smoothness in the response of
the stock of physical capital, the linearized condition shows that hours are largely
driven by technology shocks (entirely in the ﬁrst period). Therefore, the positive
comovement in hours across countries is a reﬂection of the positive cross-country
correlation of shocks.














where λ1 and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint and
the accumulation equation for organizational capital respectively. Relative to (22),
21this condition has a second term because the agent realizes that working an extra hour
will yield additional organizational capital in the future. This organizational capital
has a marginal value equal to λ3t. Additional organizational capital is valued by the
agent not only because it is an input in the production technology but also because
it is an input in the learning process, contributing to the further accumulation of














The ﬁrst term on the right captures the utility value of the extra production in period
t+1 while the second term captures the value of the additional future organizational
capital. As highlighted in section 4.1.2 the foreign agent values his stock of orga-
nizational capital and behaves in a way to limit its fall. Limiting the fall in I∗ is
one way to achieve this objective, so is working a little harder. In the no-OC model
hours worked N∗ fall when a shock hits the home country only (correlation switched
oﬀ) whereas they increase in the OC model. However, for our parametrization, the
diﬀerence in the response of N∗ across models is very small.
Based on the responses of the models with and without OC, it would appear that
GHH preferences mainly inﬂuence the dynamics of hours while OC inﬂuences the
dynamics of investment. We now turn to a calculation of second moments to see
if these changes are suﬃcient to deliver positive international correlations in all key
aggregate variables.
5. Moments
In this section we discuss the usual second moments for our model and the vari-
ant without OC which are compiled in Table 2. Table 3 provides results from our
22sensitivity analysis as we vary key parameters.
The ﬁrst column of numbers in Table 2 corresponds to the data7 while the second
column corresponds to our model.8 In the ﬁrst column, we see that the cross-country
correlation of consumption, hours, investment and output are all positive. In their
comprehensive study of cross-country correlations Ambler et al (2004) conclude that
“A remarkable common feature emerges: these correlations are mostly positive, not
very high and of a similar order of magnitude.” As the second column of numbers
shows, our model accords with their conclusion.
In order to highlight the impact of OC we report the results of the no-OC model in
the third column of numbers. We need to alter ϕ to ensure the relative volatility of
investment is still at 3.9 Similarly we need to raise ρ to 0.95 to ensure the autocorre-
lation of the Solow residual is the same in both models. Finally we raise the share of
physical capital in the production technology in order to maintain constant returns
to scale once organizational capital is removed.
Removing OC from the model has a big impact on the investment correlation which
turns sharply negative as suggested by the impulse responses discussed in section
4. Other international correlations also fall a little but remain positive. There is
no dramatic change in the relative standard deviation of consumption and hours.
Since OC aﬀects investment dynamics, we also report the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
of investment which increases only slightly. Both models are consistent with the fact
that output is negatively correlated with the trade balance-output ratio and they
7Numbers in the “Data” column are ranges constructed using the statistics reported by BKK
(1995), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), and Baxter and Farr (2005).
8Artiﬁcial data are in percent deviations from steady state (except for the trade balance) and
have been HP ﬁltered. The moments reported are averages over 1000 replications. Each replication
is 100 quarters long.
9In the no-OC model ϕ = 1.73.
23both struggle at matching the volatility of the latter. Correlations of consumption,
hours and investment with output (not reported) are all large and positive in both
models.
Table 3 reports the isolated eﬀects of varying parameters on the cross-country in-
vestment correlation coeﬃcient in our model with OC. Lowering β or raising σ as in
Table 3 barely increase the co-movement of investment. The ﬁfth column varies the
relative weight of the two capital stocks in the production technology while the sixth
column varies the weight of organizational capital and output in the accumulation
technology. The last two columns lower the correlation of the shocks and the value of
ν respectively. In all cases, the international correlation of investment is considerably
higher than in the no-OC model and in all cases but one the correlation remains pos-
itive. This compares favorably to -0.38 in the no-OC model. We conclude from our
sensitivity exercises that the ability of OC to improve the international investment
correlation is quite robust.
6. Concluding Remarks
We take a standard international real business cycle model with incomplete mar-
kets and modify it in two ways by incorporating organizational capital and by using
GHH preferences. GHH preferences help the model produce positive cross-country
correlations of hours worked. Organizational capital has a large eﬀect on the cross-
country correlation of investment. By dampening the foreign country’s willingness to
reduce investment when the home country experiences a positive productivity shock,
the model succeeds at producing a positive response of investment in both countries
when the shocks are slightly correlated across countries. These changes in investment
dynamics are suﬃcient to make the model predict a small positive cross-country corre-
24lation of investment while still matching the variance of investment relative to output.
257. Appendix
7.1 System of Equations|Model Described in Section 2
































































































































































































































































































t = 0 (45)
27P
∗
t = Pt e
−χ[Bt+1− b] (46)
There are 22 endogenous variables: C,N,Y,H,K,I,B,P,λ1,λ2,λ3 for both countries.
There are 22 equations: (25) to (46). We assume ¯ b = 0 (no asset holding in steady
state) and use the fact that capital adjustment costs are zero in steady state. The
steady state solution is presented below.
From (35) we get
Pss = β. (47)
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Iss = δKss (51)
Hss = Yss. (52)
Budget constraint (37) and ¯ b = 0 imply
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λ2ss = λ1ss (56)
28λ3ss =
βε





The model will be solved using the KPR method. Note that adding up the two budget
constraints and imposing bonds market clearing implies
Ct + C
∗
t + It + I
∗
t + Bt+1(Pt   P
∗
t ) = Yt + Y
∗
t
using (46) we get
Ct + C
∗
t + It + I
∗
t + Bt+1Pt(1   e
−χ[Bt+1− b]) = Yt + Y
∗
t .
As long as we have a steady state bond holding of zero, the linearized version of




t + It + I
∗
t = Yt + Y
∗
t . (58)
Recognizing that (linearized versions of) the two budget constraints (37) (38), the
asset equilibrium condition (45) and the resource constraint (58) are not independent,
we follow what Baxter and Crucini (1995) did when solving the model by KPR. (1)
we drop the foreign budget constraint from the system and include the resource
constraint, (2) we make the Lagrange multiplier associated with the home budget
constraint a co-state variable. In addition, we simplify the system by eliminating
prices P and P ∗ by using (35) into (37) and by combining (35), (36) and (46). As a
result, the system we work with includes 19 equations: (25)-(34), (39)-(44), (58),
Ct + It + βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t












The variables in the system are the state variables [Kt, K∗
t , Ht, H∗
t , Bt], the co-state
variables [λ2t,λ∗
2t,λ1t,λ3t,λ∗






297.2 System of Equations|No-OC Model









































































































































































































t = 0 (77)
P
∗
t = Pt e
−χ[Bt+1− b] (78)
There are 18 endogenous variables: C,N,Y,K,I,B,P,λ1,λ2, for both countries.
There are 18 equations: (61) to (78). We assume ¯ b = 0 (no asset holding in steady
state) and use the fact that capital adjustment costs are zero in steady state.
Recognizing that (linearized versions of) the two budget constraints (71) (72), the
asset equilibrium condition (77) and the world resource constraint (58) are not in-
dependent, we follow what Baxter and Crucini (1995) did when solving the model
by KPR. That is (1) we drop the foreign budget constraint from the system and
include the resource constraint, (2) we make the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the home budget constraint a co-state variable. In addition, we simplify the system
by eliminating prices P and P ∗ by using (69) into (71) and by combining (69), (70)
and (78). As a result, the system we work with includes 15 equations: (61)-(68),
31(73)-(76), (58),
Ct + It + βEt
λ1t+1
λ1t












The variables in the system are the state variables [Kt, K∗
t , Bt], the co-state variables
[λ2t,λ∗
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36Table 1: Parameter Values
Preferences: β = 0.993, σ = 2, ν = 3, ψ = 6.174.
Technology: α = 0.55, ε = 0.24.
Capital accumulation: ϕ = 2.76, δ = 0.02, γ = 0.95.
Productivity shocks: ρ = ρ∗ = 0.945, υ = υ∗ = 0, σ2
ε = 0.0122, τ = 0.323.
Others: ¯ b = 0, χ = 0.001
37Table 2 : Moments
Moment Data OC no-OC
Standard Deviations (SD)
SD(Y ) 1.69–1.92 1.82 1.82
SD(C)/SD(Y ) 0.75–0.83 0.54 0.48
SD(N)/SD(Y ) 0.61–1 0.31 0.33
SD(I)/SD(Y )† 2.78–3.27 3 3
Cross-Country Correlations
Y 0.29–0.66 0.31 0.29
C 0.12–0.51 0.43 0.27
N 0.33–0.43 0.32 0.29
I 0.25–0.53 0.15 -0.38
Others
autocorr(I) 0.91–0.92 0.67 0.65
corr(TB/Y,Y ) -0.37– -0.31 -0.16 -0.46
SD(TB/Y ) 0.39–0.62 0.15 0.87
Notes: y denotes a moment that is targeted in the calibration (see Section 3 of the paper).
Numbers in the “Data” column are ranges constructed using the statistics reported by
BKK (1995), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), and Baxter and Farr (2005). Except
for the trade balance, all data are in logs and have been detrended using the HP ﬁlter
(BKK and CKM) or a band-pass ﬁlter (BF).
38Table 3 : Sensitivity Analysis for Model with Organizational Capital.
Table 2 Table 2 β σ (α,ε) γ corr(ϵ,ϵ∗) ν
no-OC OC 0.984 3 (0.55,0.2) 0.8 0.258 2
corr(I,I∗) -0.38 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.08 0.02
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